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In the seventeenth century, John Locke asked whether we would 
end up with the same person if we replaced bodily parts one by one. 
He concluded that the person would remain the same, despite contin­
ued replacement of material parts, because the identity of a human 
being consists of continued participation in the same organized life.1
Locke’s speculation is not nearly so hypothetical today as it once 
must have seemed. We now have available, in more or less developed 
states, artificial skin, blood vessels, kidneys, ears, joints, hands, feet, 
hearts and heart valves. We can grasp, pump blood, hear, and filter 
wastes, all with artificial devices. We can transplant corneas, bone 
marrow, livers, kidneys, hearts and lungs. With the recent implanta­
tion of the artificial heart, there is a growing dispute about whether 
natural organ transplantation or artificial organ implantation present 
the best long-range therapeutic prospects.2 Yet there is very little le­
gal writing, and almost no litigation, specifically directed to the topic 
of replacement organs, artificial or natural. Perhaps this dearth of 
legal authority is a welcome reflection of the fact that artificial organs 
pose no unique or interesting legal questions for us. More likely, it 
results from the fact that the development of both organ transplanta­
tion and artificial organs is a relatively new and burgeoning field, in 
which legal thinking lags behind technological and medical advances.
There are two analogs to artificial organs with which we have long­
standing legal experience: the transfer of natural human organs, tis­
sues and fluids, particularly blood; and the use of medical devices 
that do not become a relatively permanent part of the patient, e.g., 
wheelchairs and crutches. Each analog, however, incorporates signifi­
cantly different interests than the case of artificial organs.
With respect to the effect on the receiving patient, the analogy be­
tween implanting artificial organs and transplanting natural organs 
holds fairly well. Like natural organs obtained from donors, artificial 
organs replace or supplement the recipient’s original body parts. Like
* Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Utah.
1 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human U nderstanding, Book II, Ch. 27, §§ 3-6 (1975).
* See Strauss, The Political H istory of the Artificial Heart, 210 N. Eng. J. Med. 332 (1984)
29
30 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 11
the organ it replaces, an artificial organ becomes a functioning part of 
the recipient’s physical machinery. Artificial organs, however, need 
not become physically integrated into the recipient in the same man­
ner as his original organs, or in the manner of a natural organ trans­
plant. For example, the wearable artificial kidney and the insulin 
pump can be detached readily from the patient who uses them, and 
even the drive system on the artificial heart implanted at the Univer­
sity of Utah in 1982 can be interchanged or replaced. As a result, 
artificial organs may be more readily accessible than transplanted 
natural organs; patients waiting in line for these types of devices may 
have interests that can be satisfied more readily than the interests of 
patients waiting for a natural organ transplant.
The analogy between artificial organs and transplanted organs 
breaks down further when we consider their origins. Artificial organs 
are manufactured, and much of the interest in their development 
comes from companies that plan to market them for profit. In respect 
to their origin, therefore, the transfer of artificial organs can be 
treated as an ordinary commercial transaction. Conversely, there are 
sound ethical reasons, such as protection against exploitation, for 
prohibiting living donors of natural organs from selling their body 
parts. In addition, biological limits on the availability of natural or­
gans have contributed to their persistent, distressing undersupply. It 
is understandable that much of the present law governing natural or­
gan transplantation focuses on the genuine problem of encouraging 
organ donation. This focus is myopic, however, for it loses sight of 
the concomitant need to protect the actual and potential recipients of 
natural organ transplants. With its emphasis on supply, the law deal­
ing with natural organ transplantation cannot itself be transplanted 
to deal with the issues and circumstances of commercially manufac­
tured artificial organs.
Medical devices such as crutches or hearing aids are the other ana­
log to artificial organs with which we have legal experience. Here, the 
analogy holds from the manufacturing side: medical devices are man­
ufactured, usually for profit. But it breaks down from the recipient’s 
side. Prostheses, no matter how important they may be to the pa­
tient’s quality of life, do not become a new body part of the recipient 
and may not supply an essential bodily function. Their failure may 
be a less drastic affair for the patient. Moreover, many medical de­
vices can be reused by a number of patients in succession. The gener­
alizations here are a matter of degree and do not hold in every case; a 
dialysis machine, for example, does not become a bodily part, but 
supplies an essential bodily function, and dialysis filters can be re­
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used. Nonetheless, because of the role played by artificial organs in 
sustaining life , the interest in protecting the recipient is likely to be 
stronger in the case of an artificial organ than in the case of an ordi­
nary prosthesis.
The aim of this article is to anticipate some of the novel legal 
problems that may be expected to emerge with the growing technol­
ogy of organ replacement. There is a comprehensive federal stat­
ute—the Medical Device Amendments of 1976®—designed to mini­
mize risks from the distribution of ineffective, unsafe, or ill-made 
medical devices. Otherwise, the current legal situation demonstrates 
a serious failure to think through the problems that will be posed by 
more widespread use of artificial organs, especially in the areas of 
tort and contract law. Present legal treatment of natural organ trans­
plantation, moreover, is if anything even more poorly conceived.
I . F e d e r a l  R e g u l a t io n  o f  A r t if ic ia l  O r g a n s  a n d  O r g a n  
T r a n s p l a n t a t io n
Perhaps the only comprehensive legal effort to date in the area of 
artificial organs and organ transplantation is the federal scheme 
designed to reduce the risks from medical devices distributed in in­
terstate commerce.4 This scheme has the potential to protect patients 
by setting relatively stringent standards, although it remains to be 
seen how effectively it will work in practice. By contrast, there is no 
comprehensive federal regulation of the growing field of natural or­
gan transplantation.
A. Artificial Organs
Since the passage of the Medical Device Amendments (Amend­
ments) in 1976,® producers of artificial organs in interstate commerce 
have been subject to a complex federal regulatory scheme. The 
Amendments set out a structure for classifying devices, depending on 
their importance to human health and the difficulties involved in en­
suring their safety. The Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) is authorized to promulgate performance standards for de­
vices, where standards are needed and possible, given the current 
state of research.6 Where the available technical knowledge does not 
permit the development of performance standards, but a device is 
either important to human health or poses a potentially unreasonable
* Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
4 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1982).
* Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539.
6 21 U.S.C. § 360c-d (1982).
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risk, premarket clearance is required before the device can be intro­
duced into interstate commerce.7 In addition, the Amendments pro­
vide for continued monitoring of marketed devices. The devices may 
be reclassified, performance standards may be changed, or premarket 
clearance may be withdrawn.8 The Secretary may also require public 
notice of risks, refunds, or recall and repair efforts.9 Finally, the 
Amendments allow developers of new devices to seek investigational 
device exemptions from the standards applied to marketed devices.10
The scope of the Medical Device Amendments is extremely broad, 
ranging from tongue depressors and bedpans to artificial hearts and 
kidneys. “Device” is defined in the Amendments to include any “in­
strument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in 
vitro reagent, or other similar or related article” which is intended to 
affect bodily structure or to be used in the diagnosis, treatment, cure, 
mitigation, or prevention of disease.11 Under the Amendments, de­
vices intended for human use are divided into three groups: Classes I, 
II and III. Class I, the least regulated, includes devices for which 
safety reasonably can be assured through a series of registration, in­
formation access, labelling, and record-keeping requirements.12 This 
group also includes devices that do not present an unreasonable risk 
of illness or injury, provided they are not claimed to be for use in 
supporting human life or of substantial importance in preventing 
damage to human health.13 Examples of devices falling into this first 
group are containers for storing biological specimens,14 chambers for 
cultivating anaerobic microorganisms,15 straps for holding gas masks 
in place,14 tuning forks used to diagnose hearing loss,17 manual 
stethoscopes,18 “crash carts” for storing resuscitation equipment,19 
and the stool on which the anesthesiologist sits during surgery.20 As 
these examples illustrate, the devices subject to the limited “general 
controls” of Class I present very little risk to human health.
7 Id.
8 Id. § 360c(e).
• Id. § 360h.
10 Id. § 360j(g).
11 Id. § 321(h).
'* Id. § 360c(a)(l)(A)(i).
"  Id. § 360c(a)(l)(A)(ii).
“  21 C.F.R. § 864.3250 (1983).
"  Id. § 866.2120.
'• Id. § 868.5560.
17 Id. § 882.1525.
*• Id. § 870.1875(a).
’• Id. § 868.6175.
M Id. § 868.6700.
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All devices that fall outside of Class I are subject to additional con­
trols under the Amendments. The type of control depends upon 
whether there is information available about the device sufficient to 
allow for the development of reasonable performance standards. If 
performance standards should and can be developed to provide rea­
sonable guarantees of safety and efficacy, a device is to be assigned to 
Class II.21 Congress intended safety and efficacy, not mechanical 
standardization, to be the goals of performance standards.22 A device 
is safe if its probable health benefits outweigh probable risks when 
used as intended with adequate directions.23 A device is effective 
when there is reasonable assurance that it will produce clinically sig­
nificant results in a significant portion of the target population when 
used as intended with adequate directions.24
Performance standards may include design requirements, manufac­
turing methods, testing procedures, and information to accompany 
the device.28 Standards may be developed by the Food and Drug Ad­
ministration (FDA), by other government agencies, or by the private 
sector after notice is published inviting offers to develop a standard.26 
Offers to develop standards must include information about the ex­
pertise, financial stability, and potential conflicts of interest of the 
offeror.27 This system for the development of standards was intended 
to provide great flexibility while avoiding conflicts of interest where 
manufacturers serve as their own monitors.*8 Whether it will ulti­
mately succeed in setting rigorous standards will depend upon the 
degree of care the FDA uses in selecting the available methods for 
developing standards, and, in particular, upon the selection of offer­
ors from the private sector.
The majority of medical devices have been assigned to Class II. 
Performance standards have been developed for devices as diverse as 
kits for testing blood;2® systems for testing for microorganisms and 
immune function;30 anesthesiology equipment;31 cardiac care devices
11 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(B).
“  S. Rep. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in  1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. New s  
1070, 1081.
“  21 C.F.R. § 860.7(d)(1).
“  Id. § 860.7(e)(1).
“  21 U.S.C. § 360d(a)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 861.7.
** 21 C.F.R. § 861.20(d).
"  Id. § 861.26(a).
”  S. Rep. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in  1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 
1070, 1081.
“  21 C.F.R. §§ 864.5200 - .7925 (1983).
"  Id. §§ 866.2050 - .3930, 866.5040 - .5890.
"  Id. §§ 868.1 - .6885.
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such as catheters and electrocardiographs;32 contraceptive devices 
such as diaphragms;33 and a vast range of neurological and neurosur­
gery devices from skull drills to electrodes.34
If Class I controls or Class II performance standards will not ade­
quately guarantee a device’s safety and efficacy, and if that device is 
intended to be used to sustain life or to be of substantial importance 
in preventing impairment of health, or it presents a potentially un­
reasonable risk of illness or injury, then the device is placed in Class 
III.85 Class III devices require premarket approval before they can be 
entered into interstate commerce.38 Many of the more risky and high­
ly publicized devices have been assigned to Class III: IUDs,37 pace­
makers,88 replacement heart valves,39 cardiac assist devices,40 ma­
chines for administering electroshock therapy,41 and high energy 
cardiac defibrillators.4® Public concern over injuries associated with 
pacemakers and IUDs in particular helped motivate Congress to 
adopt the Medical Device Amendments.43 Some devices for diagnos­
ing venereal disease44 and for performing abortions45 have also been 
given Class III status. Altogether, as of 1983, some seventy-three de­
vices had been placed in Class III.
Anyone may petition for premarket approval of a Class III device. 
Petitions must include full reports of investigations concerning the 
safety and effectiveness of the device, discussions of how the device is 
made and how it functions, and any samples that may be reasonably 
requested by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.48
If the Secretary finds that the petition does not provide reasonable 
assurances of the device’s safety or effectiveness, under the uses sug­
gested in the petition, premarket approval must be denied.47 Ap­
proval must also be denied for failure to conform to applicable good
“  Id. §§ 870.1280, 870.2340.
** Id. § 884.5350. See Id. P art 884 for a complete list of the obstetrical and gynecological 
devices in Class II.
M Id. P art 882.
"  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(C) (1982); 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(3) (1983).
•• 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(C).
"  21 C.F.R. § 884.5360.
"  Id. §§ 870.3600, 870.3610.
“  Id. § 870.3925.
«  Id. § 870.3600.
41 Id. § 882.5940.
4* Id. § 870.5300(b).
4* S. Rep. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 15 (1975).
“  E.g„ 21 C.F.R. §§ 866.2420, 866.3290, 866.3305.
“  E.g., id. § 884.4270.
44 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(l).
"  Id. §§ 360e(d)(2)(A),(B).
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manufacturing practice regulations, labelling requirements, or rele­
vant performance standards.48 In this petitioning process, the burden 
is on the petitioner to make a showing of safety and efficacy, rather 
than on the Secretary to demonstrate that the device is unsafe or 
medically useless. The premarket approval process thus is designed 
to function as a rigorous review process for Class III devices.
Assigning all of the available medical devices49 to classification cat­
egories is a massive undertaking, but critical to the regulatory 
scheme. The Amendments provide for classification panels to make 
recommendations to the Secretary.60 These panels are composed of 
experts from the relevant scientific and medical disciplines. Each 
panel must also include a representative from the device industry 
and a consumer representative as nonvoting members.61 Panel recom­
mendations are published in the Federal Register, and, after oppor­
tunity for comment, the Secretary of HHS promulgates a regulation 
classifying the device.82
The rigor of the scheme is enhanced by presumptions built into the 
development of the classificatory recommendations. If a device was in 
commercial distribution before the effective date of the Amendments 
(1976), and is either intended as an implant83 or represented to be for 
sustaining or supporting human life,84 the classifying panel must rec­
ommend Class III designation. An exception is allowed where the 
Commission finds the designation unnecessary to assure safety and
«  Id. §§ 360e(d)(2)(C),(D),(E).
"  The only significant limitation on the Amendment’s reach is th a t performance standards 
and premarket approval are not required for “custom” devices which are developed by medical 
order for a particular patient or for the needs of a particular practice, and which are not gener­
ally available on the market. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(b).
“  Id. a t § 360c(b)(l).
“  Id. § 360c(b)(2).
“  Id. § 360c(d).
“  A device is an “im plant” if it is to be placed in a human body cavity, formed naturally or 
surgically, and intended to remain there for 30 days or more. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(d). This defini­
tion is intentionally broad; if an implant does not pose serious risks to health, it will not be 
included in Class III. 43 Fed. Reg. 32994 (1978).
M A device is “ life supporting or sustaining” if it either is essential to, or yields information 
essential to, a bodily function im portant to continued human life. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(e). Artifi­
cial hearts, blood vessels, and implantable kidneys are “implants” and are also “life support­
ing” if they perform essential bodily functions. Artificial ears and eyes are “implants.” Artificial 
limbs, hands or feet are “implants” if they are attached into a bodily cavity. Present day dialy­
sis machines or cardiac monitors are “life supporting or sustaining.” Artificial skin is “life sup­
porting” if it is essential to keeping the patient alive, as in the case of a burn victim. Nearly all 
artificial organs, therefore, will fall into Class III unless findings are made tha t their safety and 
efficacy can be guaranteed by alternative categorization. As a result, artificial organs will almost 
certainly be subject either to premarket clearance or to the performance standard requirements 
of the Amendments.
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efficacy. Any such decision must be accompanied by a statement of 
reasons from the panel.88 Likewise, a decision by the Secretary not to 
place an implant or life support device in Class III must be accompa­
nied by “a full statement of reasons,” with supporting documentation 
and a statement of risks to health, if any, that the device presents.86 
Devices developed after 1976 are placed initially in Class III, unless 
they are affirmatively assigned to Class I or Class II by the Secre­
tary.87 Implants or life support devices cannot be assigned to Class I 
or Class II without the findings required for implants which were on 
the market in 1976.88
The regulatory scheme set out in the Amendments neither ends 
nor begins with a device’s marketplace debut. Based on new informa­
tion about a device, the Secretary has the statutory authority to 
change a device’s classification or to revoke any performance stan­
dard or premarket clearance regulation in effect with respect to that 
device. The Secretary may seek a recommendation from the panel 
that classified the device, but any recommendation so secured must 
be published in the Federal Register.89 Classifications may be altered 
through a petition process governed by FDA regulations. These regu­
lations provide that petitions for reclassification must be accompa­
nied by a supplemental data sheet, a full statement of reasons why 
the device should be reclassified and why the reclassification will as­
sure safety and efficacy. Also required is information known to the 
petitioner that might counsel against the reclassification request.60 
Because a petitioner for reclassification has a relatively onerous task 
it may prove difficult to get a device reclassified into a more lenient 
category.
In addition to the authority to reclassify, the Secretary may take 
more drastic steps to protect the public from defective or otherwise 
harmful devices. To avoid an unreasonable risk of substantial harm 
to human health, the Secretary may order publication of notice to all 
those involved in the use of the device: manufacturers, health profes­
sionals, and users.61 Notice must be sent to device users unless the 
Secretary finds that the notice itself would be a greater risk to health
•• 21 U.S.C. § 360c(c)(2)(C). Transitional provisions governing devices formerly classified by 
the FDA as drugs are to the same effect. Id. § 360j(l)(l).
M Id. § 360c(d)(2)(B).
"  Id. § 360c(f)(l).
"  Id. §§ 360c(f)(2)(B)(i), (C)(i),
•• Id. § 360c(e).
80 21 C.F.R. § 860.123(a).
81 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a).
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than its absence. If this is so, the notice to health professionals must 
require them to inform their patients of the risks involved and of any 
ameliorative steps that might be taken.8* If, after opportunity for an 
informal hearing, the Secretary finds that notice alone would not pro­
tect the public from an unreasonable risk of substantial harm, those 
responsible for the device may be ordered to come up with a plan for 
repair, replacement, or refund.63 Remedies under this section of the 
statute explicitly do not preclude additional recovery under state or 
federal law.64 Given the uncertainties of state law,66 however, these 
other remedies may prove evanescent.
To allow for the development of new devices, the Amendments 
permit the Secretary to exempt devices under experimentation from 
much of the regulatory scheme, including performance standards and 
premarket clearance requirements.66 Investigators must acquire an 
“investigational device exemption” (IDE) in order to begin interstate 
shipment of a device designed for experimental use.67 Unless a device 
poses “significant risks,” an IDE is obtained automatically if a spon­
sor follows appropriate labelling and record-keeping practices and 
conforms with federal requirements governing review of research with 
human subjects, unless the FDA informs the sponsor otherwise.68 A 
device poses “significant risks” if it presents a potential for serious 
risk to health, safety, or welfare.89 Redundantly, the federal regula­
tions also specify that a device poses “significant risks” if it presents 
that potential for serious risk and is intended as an implant; is pur­
ported to be for use in supporting or sustaining human life; or is for a 
use of substantial importance in diagnosing, curing, mitigating, or 
treating disease, or preventing impairment of health.70 Thus, research 
on all artificial organs must undergo review as research on human 
subjects, and generally will require formal application71 to the FDA
“  Id.
“  Id. § 360h(b).
M Id. § 360h(d).
M See infra text accompanying notes 91 to 181.
«  Id. § 360j(g).
"  21 C.F.R. § 812.1(a).
“  Id. § 812.2(b).
M Id. § 812.3(m)(4).
,0 Id. §§ 812.3(m)(l)-(3).
”  Formal application for an IDE is a comprehensive process. I t requires submission of a 
complete report about earlier investigations of the device, with copies of all published and un­
published adverse information. Id. § 812.20(b)(2), 812.27(b)(1). I t  also must include a protocol 
demonstrating the scientific soundness of the proposed experiment, and an analysis of the risks 
posed to subjects from the research. Id. §§ 812.25(b), (c). Certification of review as research 
with human subjects is also required. Id. § 812.25(h).
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for an IDE as well.
The federal scheme for review of research with human subjects re­
lies on a system of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) at institutions 
sponsoring the research. Regulations have been promulgated by the 
FDA governing research within its purview, and by HHS, governing 
research under its more general sponsorship.72 These regulations now 
have been synchronized on all but a few provisions. IRB review78 
must assess the risks and benefits of proposed research and assure 
that human subjects give informed consent before participating. 
IRBs are required to disapprove research in which risks to subjects 
are not minimized or are not reasonable in relation to anticipated 
direct benefits, either for the subjects or in terms of the knowledge 
gained from the research.74 IRBs must also disapprove research if the 
selection of research subjects is inequitable or if informed consent is 
not obtained from subjects.78 Special provisions have been included 
in the HHS regulations for assessing the risks and benefits of ob­
taining informed consent when research includes children or prison­
ers as subjects.79 At this point, no special regulations have been 
adopted governing research on mentally disabled subjects.
B. Federal Regulation of Natural Organ Transplantation
In contrast to the regulation of medical devices, there is no com­
prehensive federal regulation of organ transplantation. If it is re­
search and involves the testing of investigational drugs or devices, 
organ transplantation is subject to the federal regulations governing 
research with human subjects. For example, organ transplantation 
programs in which cyclosporine was tested came under IRB review. 
Organ transplantation research that is federally funded must receive
The FDA may reject an IDE application if it contains false or misleading information, or if 
the risks of investigation are greater than the benefits to subjects or of the knowledge to be 
obtained. I t may reject an application if the informed consent of subjects is not adequately 
assured. Id. § 812.30(b). The FDA also has the authority to withdraw approval of an IDE. Id. § 
812.30(c).
71 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101 - 56.124; 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101 - 46.409.
7* For general discussion of IRB review, see Bosso, Considerations of the Institu tional Re­
view Board in Artificial Organ Development, 11 Journal o f  Contemporary Law 61 (1984).
74 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.111(a)(1),(2); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(a)(1),(2).
78 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.111(a)(3),(4); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(a)(3),(4) (1983). For consent to be “in­
formed,” the subject must have an adequate opportunity to consider participating in the re­
search in an unpressured situation; m ust be given an explanation of the research in understand­
able language, including a description of what will be done, risks, benefits, and alternatives; 
m ust not be made to waive any rights or relieve the researcher from liability for negligence; and 
m ust be entitled to leave the experiment a t any time without loss of benefits tha t would other­
wise be available. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a).
7* 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401 - 46.409, 46.301 - 46.306.
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IRB approval.77 Other federal standards have been promulgated for 
the supply of blood and blood components. Other than these few fed­
eral restrictions, the regulation of organ transplantation or the trans­
fer of natural body tissues or fluids is entirely a state matter.
Without a nexus to federal concerns, there is no mandate for organ 
transplantation research to be subject to IRB review. Some states, 
however, require review of all research conducted on human sub­
jects.78 Individual institutions sponsoring research may also require 
IRB review of research that falls outside the federal purview. The 
University of Utah, for example, requires all research with human 
subjects under its sponsorship to receive IRB clearance.79 It appears 
that a number of the major organ transplant programs across the 
country regularly subject their protocols to IRB review, at least until 
a research procedure becomes established therapy.80
As described above, IRB review includes a determination that the 
benefits of research outweigh its risks. Subject selection must also be 
equitable, and subjects must not be allowed to participate without 
voluntary and informed consent.81 Once transplant programs have 
passed beyond research, they are no longer subject to these special 
federal protections. Patients must rely on the background of state 
law to ensure they are adequately protected from unsafe, unwanted, 
or unfair medical procedures.
The FDA regulations controlling blood and blood products classify 
these fluids as pharmaceuticals and subject them to the labelling re­
quirements of the Food and Drug Act.82 Good manufacturing practice 
requirements specify personnel qualifications, equipment, record­
keeping, and operating procedures for blood suppliers.83 These in­
clude the requirement that donors be screened for suitability.84 Addi­
tional standards for specific blood products stipulate that donors of 
whole blood must be examined briefly for good health,88 and that 
plasma donors must receive initial examinations from a physician.86 
Plasma source donors are also protected by a requirement of in­
77 21 C.F.R. § 50.1(a); 45 C.F.R. § 46.101.
78 E.g., 44 New York Pub. H ea lth  Law §§ 2440-46 (McKinney 1977).
™ University of Utah, Institutional Review B oard (Medical), P olicies and P rocedures,
I.
88 Conversations with members of IRBs, on file with the author.
81 See supra notes 72 - 75 and accompanying text.
"  See 21 C.F.R. § 201.
“  Id. §§ 606.20 - .170.
M Id. § 606.100(b)(1).
“  Id. § 640.3.
“  Id. § 640.63(b).
formed consent.87
There has been a recent flutter of Congressional activity concern­
ing natural organ transplants. Concern, however, has been directed 
entirely towards ensuring an adequate supply of organs and financing 
expensive transplant procedures. In the fall of 1983, several bills were 
introduced into Congress to facilitate the availability of donated or­
gans by establishing, inter alia, a national organ registry.88 These 
bills, however, ignore issues of patient protection, except that they 
prohibit the purchase of natural body parts.89 Of course, it is in the 
interest of desperately ill patients to have donated organs available, 
but it would be better still not to forget safety in the rush to generate 
a supply.
In summary, in the case of natural organ transplants, federal pro­
tections for research subjects may be available, at least until a trans­
plantation technique ceases to be experimental. In the case of artifi­
cial organs, the federal regulatory scheme provides a filter which, if it 
works properly, will keep ill-designed, poorly made, or ineffective de­
vices from reaching patients. At the experimental stage, it will pro­
tect patients as research subjects by ensuring that patient selection is 
equitable and accompanied by informed consent. In neither case, 
however, does the federal scheme provide any recovery for the pa­
tient who is injured by a defective device or organ, given poor medi­
cal treatment, or denied treatment because of an inequitable patient 
selection process or the inability to pay. Patients must rely upon 
state law to fill these gaps; but, at present, state law does not do so 
very well.
II. O r g a n  R e p l a c e m e n t  U n d e r  S t a t e  L aw
Standard doctrines of medical tort law—liability for negligence or 
battery in the case of physical contact without consent—quite clearly 
apply to organ replacement, just as they apply to other cases of medi­
cal treatment. Less clear, however, is the relevance of other doctrines 
of tort and contract law. Both implants and transplants involve what 
is arguably a product: the organ. The doctrines of strict product lia­
bility in tort or implied warranty of merchantability in contract, 
therefore, might apply in either case, especially if the organ transfer 
is a for-profit transaction. A number of states, however, have inter­
posed statutes designed to encourage natural organ donation by insu-
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m H.R. 4320, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 2048, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 4180, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
“  H.R. 4320 § 352A(a).
lating donors and health care personnel from liability beyond tradi­
tional battery or negligence. If the expensive process of organ 
replacement is not financed publicly, other commercial law doctrines, 
such as taking a security interest in the implanted organ, might be 
involved. The expense of organ replacement may also place new 
strains on the rights and duties of the physician-patient contractual 
relationship as they are traditionally defined. Potential areas of 
strain include the physician’s right not to enter the relationship, the 
patient’s supposedly absolute right to withdraw, and the rights and 
duties of a health care provider when a patient fails to pay. The re­
sult of all this is a set of very clouded legal protections for the recipi­
ents of natural organs, potentially major differences between the legal 
rights and remedies of recipients of donated organs and those of arti­
ficial organs, and an unsatisfactory understanding of the physician- 
patient relationship in either case.
A. Traditional Tort Law: Karp v. Cooley
The only litigated case involving the implantation of an artificial 
organ illustrates how traditional battery and malpractice theories 
might apply to artificial organs.90 In 1969—well before adoption of 
the federal scheme regulating medical devices or research with 
human subjects—Dr. Denton Cooley, a Houston heart surgeon, im­
planted an artificial heart in Haskell Karp. After an unsuccessful ef­
fort to remove scar tissue from Karp’s heart, and after it became 
clear that the heart was too damaged to permit recovery from sur­
gery, Dr. Cooley implanted the artificial device. It was intended as a 
temporary measure only, to allow time for a heart transplant to be 
arranged. Karp remained alive on the artificial heart for 64 hours, 
including periods of time in which he was awake and responsive. A 
transplant was then performed, but Karp died of pneumonia and re­
nal failure 32 hours later. His widow brought suit, alleging that her 
husband had not consented to the artificial heart implantation and 
that Dr. Cooley had been negligent in attempting to remove the scar 
tissue from her husband’s heart. The court held that she had failed 
to prove a case on either theory.91
In traditional tort law, absent extenuating circumstances such as 
the emergency nature of the treatment, it is a battery for a physician 
to operate upon a patient without consent.92 Today, the physician’s
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“  Id. a t 421-23.
"  E.g., A. H old er , M edical M alp ractice  Law 225-30 (2d ed. 1978).
failure to disclose the risks of treatment is more likely to be tried as 
malpractice if it falls short of the standard of care required of physi­
cians in a jurisdiction and results in harm to the patient.93 In some 
jurisdictions, the standard of care required for disclosure of risks is 
physician-centered; it requires proof of customary practices of dis­
closure in an area,94 or of what the reasonable physician, practicing a 
similar type of medicine in a similar locality, would disclose.96 Other 
jurisdictions argue that the basis of informed consent is the patient’s 
right to decide what will happen to his body. These jurisdictions have 
adopted a patient-centered standard of disclosure: the physician is 
required to reveal what the reasonable person in the patient’s situa­
tion would want to know.96
Texas law, applied by the court in Karp, adheres to the reasonable 
physician standard, and requires expert medical testimony about the 
disclosures that would be made by the reasonable practitioner in the 
relevant medical community.97 In this case, Mrs. Karp introduced ev­
idence that Mr. Karp was neither informed of the uniquely experi­
mental nature of the proposed artificial heart nor of the risks that 
might result from its use. She did not, however, provide proof of 
“what risks under these circumstances a physician should disclose.”98 
Perhaps she could not produce the required proof; under the experi­
mental circumstances of her husband’s case, there was no recognized 
standard of what the reasonable physician would disclose.
If so, the case illustrates how a physician-centered standard of dis­
closure may break down at the vanguard of medical practice. In juris­
dictions where the reasonable physician standard is applied, when 
standards of disclosure have yet to be established—as may well be 
the situation for artificial organ technologies under develop­
ment—patients will be unable to prove that a failure to disclose was 
malpractice. In a jurisdiction in which the standard of disclosure is 
based on what the reasonable patient would want to know, by con­
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93 Id. a t 231.
94 E.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054-55 (1975); Fuller v. Starnes, 
597 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Ark. 1980).
95 E.g., Ziegert v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 99 111. App. 3d 83, 425 N.E. 2d 450, 458­
59 (1981); Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tx. 1977).
9* E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 688 
(R.I. 1972); Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246, 1254 (1980); Trogun 
v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 207 N.W.2d 297, 314 (1973). See generally Note, Restructuring 
Inform ed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 Y ale  L.J. 1533 
(1970) (arguing for reasonable patient standard of disclosure).
97 Karp, 493 F.2d a t 420.
98 Id. a t 421 (emphasis in original).
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trast, a basis for recovery would be provable even in the most experi­
mental medical case. Similar inability to prove a case is likely where 
disclosure standards have not coalesced for emerging techniques of 
organ transplantation. In jurisdictions in which liability for natural 
organ transplantation is confined to intentional wrongdoing or negli­
gence," the use of a physician-centered standard of disclosure may 
prove especially curtailing to patient remedies.
Mrs. Karp also alleged that Dr. Cooley had been negligent in at­
tempting surgical repair of Mr. Karp’s heart. Here again, she was re­
quired to prove that Dr. Cooley’s conduct had fallen short of the 
standard of care provided by similarly situated medical specialists, 
and her proof failed.100 The court held that under Texas law this evi­
dentiary standard would not be affected by the fact that treatment 
afforded her husband was experimental.101
Mrs. Karp’s failure to prove negligence in the initial effort to repair 
her husband’s heart may not have been related to the case’s experi­
mental aspects, which developed after the surgery failed. Nonethe­
less, it is clear here, too, that it is difficult to prove a malpractice 
theory when standards of treatment have not yet developed. In a 
malpractice case, the plaintiff must prove that the practitioner’s care 
fell below that provided by other physicians—or specialists, if a spe­
cialty is in question—in similar communities, or, increasingly, in the 
region or nation.102 If there are no recognized procedures for an ex­
perimental case, plaintiffs will be unable to recover on a malpractice 
theory.
B. Strict Products Liability
The doctrine of strict products liability is another theory on which 
patients might recover for damages caused by malfunctioning artifi­
cial organs. Initially, this doctrine seems more likely to yield reme­
dies for patients than a negligence action, because it requires proof
”  See infra notes 146 to 150 and accompanying text.
,<M> 493 F.2d a t 423.
101 Id. a t 423-24.
1#* E.g., Priest v. Lindig, 583 P.2d 173,175-78 (Alaska 1978) (same or similar locality); White 
v. Edison, 361 So. 2d 1292, 1295 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (national standard for specialists); Shilkret 
v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass’n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245, 253 (Md. 1975) (national 
standard for all physicians); Halligan v. Cotton, 193 Neb. 331, 227 N.W. 2d 10, 12 (1975) (same 
or similar locality); Orcutt v. Miller, 595 P.2d 1191, 1194-95 (Nev. 1979) (national standard for 
board-certified specialist). Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 537 (Utah 1981) (similar locality 
nile requires application of national standards to board-certified specialist in major city). See 
generally A. H o ld er , supra  note 92, a t 58-59; 1 D.W. L o u ise ll & H. W illiam s, M edical M al­
practice II 8.06 (1983 & Supp. Nov. 1983).
that the product was defective rather than that the defendant was 
negligent. As it has been applied to transfers of natural bodily parts 
and prostheses, however, the doctrine has not been very helpful to 
plaintiffs. One difficulty is that the transfers at issue have been held 
to be “services” and not “sales.”103 Another lies in the standards that 
have been adopted for deciding when a risky product is defective.
As formulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the doctrine 
of strict liability requires the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant 
was engaged in the business of selling products of the kind at issue, 
(2) the product was not altered after it left the control of the defen­
dant, (3) the product was defective in the sense that it was unreason­
ably dangerous, and (4) the product caused the plaintiff harm.104 The 
Restatement explains that “unreasonably dangerous” means “dan­
gerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary consumer.”106 Some products cannot be made entirely safe. 
Drugs, for example, often cause untoward side effects, even more so 
in experimental situations in which their full potential is unknown. 
When a product is unavoidably unsafe, the Restatement suggests 
that the test for whether it is “unreasonably dangerous” should be 
whether the benefits of the product outweigh its risks.106
The Restatement approach to an unavoidably risky product, how­
ever, is not entirely congruent with its initial explanation that a 
product is unreasonably dangerous when it has danger beyond ordi­
nary consumer expectations. Risks, even though undetectable and ul­
timately justifiable, may be entirely unanticipated by the ordinary 
user of a product. The line of cases considering whether a strict lia­
bility remedy should be available for damages caused by transfusions 
of hepatitis- infected blood is illustrative of the incongruity. The vast 
majority of courts have held against recovery in those cases. Some 
courts have pointed out that no reliable test exists for detecting hep­
atitis and have concluded that blood is therefore unavoidably un­
safe.107 Other courts, applying a risk/benefit analysis, have contended 
that the social utility of having blood available, hepatitis test or not, 
far outweighs the risk that a few patients will become ill.108 Analo­
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107 E.g., McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975); Moore v. 
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gous reasoning has been applied by courts in the few cases litigating 
the issue of whether a medical device such as a pacemaker is unrea­
sonably dangerous.109
The ordinary patient, however, may not expect to get hepatitis as a 
result of the blood transfusion, despite the fact that the risk is very 
real. Indeed, this is the conclusion reached by the few courts that 
have allowed recovery on behalf of patients contracting hepatitis 
from infected blood.110 Those courts have relied upon the ordinary 
user standard and concluded that hepatitis-infected blood is unrea­
sonably dangerous.
If the reasoning of the blood transfusion cases were applied to re­
placement organs, liability would be precluded in most jurisdictions. 
Both natural organ transplants and artificial organ implants cause 
harm ineluctably: natural organs may be rejected and artificial organs 
may fail. On the risk/benefit approach to strict liability, recovery for 
unavoidable damage from a replacement organ would be possible 
only when benefits of the organ replacement procedure at issue do 
not outweigh the risks. If the benefits of the artificial heart outweigh 
the risks of failure, for example, the risk/benefit approach would pre­
clude recovery for damage caused by the sort of unpredictable valve 
breakage that necessitated additional surgery for the first recipient of 
the Utah artificial heart.111 The impact of the ordinary user standard, 
by contrast, would depend upon whether user expectations had coa­
lesced and what they were. If, for example, recipients of prosthetic 
hip joints expected to have to replace them relatively frequently, a 
joint that failed quickly would not be unreasonably dangerous—even 
it if were possible to design a more long-lasting prosthetic device.
The approaches of the blood transfusion cases are less than satis­
factory. First, to conclude from the inability to discover a defect that 
a product is unavoidably unsafe is to insulate producers of highly 
dangerous products from liability, so long as the defects cannot be 
discovered. To add the requirement that the benefits of a product 
must outweigh its risks, however, is not to add enough. Having the 
product and doing without it are two extremes bounding a wide 
range of strategies for reducing a product’s risks. For example, a 
more accurate blood test is not the only possible method for reducing 
the risks of hepatitis from blood. Donated blood is less likely than
10* E.g., Dreiling v. General Elec. Co., 511 F.2d 768, 776 (5th Cir. 1975).
110 E.g., DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26, 31 (La. 1981); Cunning­
ham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 111. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (111. 1970).
111 DeVries, et al., Clinical Use of the Total Artificial Heart, 310 N. Eng. J. Med. 274 (Feb.
2, 1984).
purchased blood to be infected; several states now either prohibit 
blood banking for profit or require bought blood to be used only 
when volunteer blood is unobtainable.112 A proper risk/benefit analy­
sis, therefore, should consider whether the cost/benefit ratio of the 
product as presently designed is more favorable than the comparable 
ratio for available alternative designs.
This kind of cost/benefit analysis engages the court in difficult 
questions of social policy. But it carries out more fully the Restate­
ment’s suggested program for deciding whether a product is unrea­
sonably dangerous by weighing the risks and benefits of the product 
in its current form against available alternatives. Moreover, it sub­
jects products that are likely to cause harm to a more exacting scru­
tiny and encourages efforts to design them as safely as possible. This 
scrutiny seems especially important for products such as replacement 
organs that can cause great damage to life or health.113
While certainly an improvement, this amended cost/benefit ap­
proach still ignores a central policy of strict products liability: com­
pensating the consumer for damage when he has had no choice about 
avoiding the risk of harm. Including consumer expectations in a de­
termination of when a product is unreasonably dangerous appears to 
realize this goal more fully. If a consumer has no idea that a product 
has potential risks, he will not be in a position to try to avoid them. 
Thus it seems reasonable to allow recovery when a product is more 
dangerous than normally expected, despite the possibility that on 
balance the product is designed to minimize risks.114
It does not follow from this discussion, however, that if a product 
meets consumer expectations, it is not unreasonably dangerous. Con­
sumers may simply be resigned to expect too little from the products 
they use. This concern led California to adopt a far more satisfactory 
two-tier approach to defining a product defect. The test analyzes 
first, whether the product has risks outside the expectations of the 
ordinary consumer, and second, whether the advantages and risks of 
the product as designed outweigh the advantages and risks of alter­
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native designs.118 The California test not only takes consumer expec­
tations into account but also seems likely to provide manufacturers 
with independent incentives to design products to minimize risks.116 
The California approach is obviously not in line with the majority of 
the blood transfusion cases. If the predominant analyses of those 
cases are applied to organ replacement, injured patients will in all 
likelihood not be compensated even though reasonable improvements 
in the replacement organ were possible, and even though risks far 
exceeded expectations.
Another doctrine of strict liability — that a product may be defec­
tive because of the manufacturer’s failure to warn consumers of its 
risks — will not fill the gaps that remain in protection. The doctrine 
may be applied in such a way that a manufacturer need not warn a 
patient and that patient may never know of any risks associated with 
the product he was using, and yet no liability would attach to the 
manufacturer. It is commonly held that manufacturers of risky drugs 
and medical devices have a duty to warn users. Both breast prosthe- 
ses and IUDs, for example, have been held to require warnings on 
this ground.117 The policy argument for requiring the warnings is to 
allow the consumer a choice, if possible, about whether and how to 
use the product. In the case of prescription drugs and devices, how­
ever, courts have held that warnings need only be given to physicians, 
unless the FDA specifically requires warnings to patients as well.118 
Unless physicians can be relied upon to act as “learned in­
termediaries]” in communicating warnings to patients,11® this limita­
tion undermines the policy behind the duty to warn of a product’s 
risks.
C. Breach of Warranty
Another potential theory of recovery for a patient injured by a re­
placement organ is breach of warranty under the Uniform Commer­
cial Code. Many states have statutes precluding suit on a breach of 
warranty theory for defects in transplanted human body parts.120
119 New Jersey has also adopted the California approach. See  Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & 
Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 150-51 (1979); Special Project, Recent Developments in 
Commercial Law, 11 R ut. Cam. L.J. 527, 589-613 (1980).
"* Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 C alif. L. Rev. 435, 461-62 
(1979).
117 E.g., Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 99 N.J. 645, 662 P.2d 646 (1983); McKee v. Moore, 648 
P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982).
“ * Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 90 Wash. 2d 9, 577 P.2d 975, 978 (Wash. 1978) (en banc). 
“ » Id.
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Even ignoring this limitation, however, there are many respects in 
which current breach of warranty theory is not well equipped to han­
dle the problems posed by artificial organs.
The Code enumerates three warranty theories of relevance here: 
express warranties, implied warranties of merchantability, and im­
plied warranties of fitness for particular purposes. Express warranties 
are affirmative representations by the seller that a product has the 
characteristics claimed.1*1 Implied warranties of merchantability arise 
from the sale itself: a merchant seller is charged with representing 
that the goods he conveys are of average quality and fit for ordinary 
purposes, unless he specifies otherwise.122 An implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose arises when the seller has reason to 
know the buyer’s particular needs and the buyer relies on the seller’s 
selection of goods.123 In most medical situations, any implied war­
ranty of fitness is likely to collapse into an implied warranty of 
merchantability. For a medical device to be fit for the patient’s pur­
poses, simply is for it to be of fair average quality of its kind.124 The 
difference between the two theories may be important, however, in a 
state which specifically excludes any implied warranty of 
merchantability for human body parts.
A first significant barrier to recovery by patients on a breach of 
warranty theory is the requirement of privity of contract. Although 
the Code is drafted to enable states to adopt alternatives to priv­
ity,125 more than half the states have continued to insist on some 
type of privity in a breach of warranty action.126 Patients who receive 
new organs from physicians or health care facilities are unlikely to be 
in privity with the original manufacturers or procurers of the organs. 
In states insisting on privity, they will not be able to win on a breach 
of warranty theory.
A second major difficulty in a suit for breach of warranty on a de­
fective replacement organ involves the largely uncharted Code terri­
tory of whether a warranty has been made or disclaimed. Under the 
Code, express warranties can be avoided by silence—they simply are 
not made—and implied warranties can be expressly disclaimed.127
121 U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (1978).
122 Id. § 2-314.
12» Id. § 2-315.
114 E.g., Friedman v. Medtronic, Inc., 42 A.D. 2d 185, 345 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1973) (pacemaker). 
Where medical devices are custom designed, however, there may be a separate implied war­
ranty of fitness.
U.C.C. § 2-318.
,2‘ U.C.C. § 2-318, 1A U.L.A. 55 (1976).
1,7 U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
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Remedies for breach of warranty also can be limited, for example, to 
the repair or replacement of defective parts—little help to the person 
whose pacemaker electrode has failed although excluding damages 
for personal injury from consumer goods is presumptively 
unconscionable.128
The federal regulations governing commercially marketed medical 
devices probably compel the manufacturer to make at least some ex­
press warranties. Medical devices used in commerce must, with cer­
tain exceptions, be labelled; and labelling must include a statement 
of intended uses and adequate directions for use.129 The FDA regula­
tions, however, do not require that the label represent the device as 
safe or effective for intended uses. There remains a question of inter­
pretation whether a given label expressly warrants that a medical de­
vice will perform as expected.130 FDA also does not prohibit warranty 
disclaimers, but under the Magnuson-Moss Act a supplier who makes 
any written warranties with respect to a consumer good cannot dis­
claim implied warranties.131 It thus appears that producers of medical 
devices, including artificial organs, cannot disclaim implied warran­
ties of merchantability or fitness for particular purpose.
Transferors of natural body parts other than blood, however, are 
not covered by the federal labelling requirements. Absent state law to 
the contrary, they could avoid making express warranties and dis­
claim any implied warranties. A few states have labelling require­
ments for some natural body parts, including blood, but many do 
not.18* There is also some very limited authority to the effect that if 
it is unconscionable to exclude remedies for personal injuries from a 
breach of warranty, it is also unconscionable to disclaim all implied 
warranties.133 Otherwise, under state law it seems quite possible that 
transactions involving bodily parts could entirely disclaim implied 
warranties.
A final uncertainty in using breach of warranty for defective re­
Id. § 719(3).
21 C.F.R § 801 (1983).
Indeed, federal regulations for labelling of investigational devices specify that their label­
ling must bear the caution that the device is investigational and avoid any representation that 
it is safe or effective. Id. § 812.5.
1,1 15 U.S.C. § 2305 (1982).
E.g., Cal. H ealth  & Safety Code § 1603.5 (Deering 1982); Fla. S ta t. Ann. § 381.601 
(West Supp. 1983).
See 3 U.C.C. Service (MB) § 7.03(2)(1980); Schwartz, supra note 116, at 456-57; Note, 
Legal Control on Warranty Liability Limitation Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Va. 
L. Rev. 791 (1977). Alabama has adopted an altered version of § 2-316 which codifies this infer­
ence. Ala. Code § 7-2-316(5) (1980).
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placement organs is the interpretation to be given an implied war­
ranty of merchantability. The Code explains that merchantable goods 
must, among their other characteristics, be “fit for ordinary purposes 
for which such goods are used.”134 If this provision were given a 
strong literal meaning—that any failure of a good used as ordinarily 
intended is a breach of the implied warranty of merchantabili­
ty—then any case of failure of a properly implanted organ in a prop­
erly managed patient who follows medical directions would involve a 
breach of the warranty. This approach, however, would make the 
manufacturer a complete insurer of his product, even more so than 
under strict liability. The prevailing view seems to be that the stan­
dards for deciding whether a product is unreasonably dangerous 
under section 402A of the Restatement, and whether it is fit for ordi­
nary purposes under section 314 of the Code, should be the same. If 
goods are not fit for ordinary purposes, they are unreasonably dan­
gerous and vice versa.138 Perhaps the only theoretically cogent expla­
nation of the relationship between the two standards is that to inter­
pret unreasonable dangerousness in terms of the expectations of 
ordinary consumers for strict liability purposes reflects the warranty 
roots of strict liability.188 Without further articulation of a distinction 
between the two doctrines, implied warranty cannot be used to solve 
the substantive inadequacies of strict products liability discussed 
above.
D. Blood Transfusions and Organ Transplants: State Limitations
on Liability.
States have chosen a wide variety of ways to limit the liability of 
donors, suppliers and providers of health care for damage from the 
transfer of natural body parts. These limitations on liability are moti­
vated by the hope of encouraging supplies, although many have been 
in effect for twenty years and the undersupply of organs continues. 
Some state statutory limits rule out patient remedies except for the 
traditional intentional torts and negligence; the reach of other stat­
utes is either more limited or less clearly defined. In the interests of 
protecting patients, these limits should not be applied by analogy to 
the development of artificial organs, which appears to be a fully com­
mercial enterprise. If they are not so applied, however, the law will 
give strikingly different remedies to patients receiving defective arti­
,M U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
136 See, e.g., Perfetti, 662 P.2d at 654; McMichael, 532 S.W. 2d 7.
la* E.g., Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 456 (1978);
Schwartz, supra note 116, at 448, 458.
ficial and donated organs. This result will occur despite the fact that 
the two may be alternative therapies and each was obtained in a sale 
for profit.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,187 now adopted in all states, was 
designed to further organ donation at death. The Act creates two im­
munities from liability. A donee is not to be liable for refusing a gift 
or in good faith failing to carry out the wishes of a donor.138 Anyone 
who causes tissues to be removed in good faith reliance on a gift is 
not liable for the removal.189 Both of these immunities are critical to 
donor and physician participation in anatomical giving, and the Uni­
form Act makes no further efforts to allocate liability among donors, 
health care personnel, transfer agencies or donees.
Most states, however, have adopted additional statutes which limit 
the application of strict products liability and implied warranty to 
the transfer of human bodily parts. Many of these statutes sweep 
quite broadly, extending blanket immunity to both commercial and 
non-commercial enterprises.
A number of states specify that the transfer of human body parts, 
whether for profit or not, is to be considered a “service” and not a 
“sale.”140 Some apply this doctrine to blood only.141 These state stat­
utes are intended to preclude suit on strict liability or warranty theo­
ries, and sometimes say so explicitly.142 Even without explicit state­
ment, these statutes succeed in blocking implied warranty suits, for 
implied warranties arise under the Uniform Commercial Code only
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140 Ala. Code § 7-2-314 (1980); Colo. Rev. S ta t. § 13-22-104(2) (1974); Conn. Gen. S ta t. § 
19a-280 (1983); Ind. Code. Ann. § 16-8-7-2 (Burns 1983); Iowa Code Ann. § 142A.8 (West 
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(Supp. 1983-84); Mich. S ta t. Ann. § 14.15(9121) (Callaghan 1980); Minn. S ta t. Ann. § 525.928 
(West 1975); Mo. Ann. S ta t. § 431.069 (Vernon Supp. 1984); Neb. Rev. S ta t. § 71-4001 (1981); 
Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 2108.111 (Page 1976) (excludes hair); W. Va. Code § 16-23-1 (1979); 
Wis. S ta t. Ann. § 146.31(2) (West Supp. 1983). Wisconsin also precludes the sale of blood for 
profit, id. § 146.31(1) (1974).
141 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1606 (Deering 1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-3701 (1980) 
(also precludes warranties for blood); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-1 (1981); Utah Code Ann. § 26­
31-1 (Supp. 1983).
141 There are many variations on this theme. Colorado and Wisconsin rule out any suits for 
damage, absent negligence, in the case of such services. Connecticut and West Virginia preclude 
suit on an implied warranty theory; Indiana and Michigan specify that there are to be no im­
plied warranty or strict tort liability suits for services with respect to human body parts. Iowa 
grants immunity for strict liability suits, but stipulates that any provider of the services in 
question warrants due care and conformity to accepted, current medical standards. Missouri 
precludes suit on an implied warranty theory for defects that cannot be detected or removed. 
See supra note 140.
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for sales or analogous transactions.143 The effect of these provisions 
on strict liability, however, is somewhat less clear. If courts apply the 
doctrine of strict liability to the sale of services, and there is some 
movement in this direction,144 these statutes leave the door theoreti­
cally open to a strict liability suit. It is unlikely that the door would 
be open to suits against medical professionals—suits which would, at 
least in the case of organ transfers, involve a radical shift in the basis 
of malpractice liability from negligence to strict liability.148 It is also 
unlikely that the door would be open to suits against non-profit agen­
cies such as hospitals and blood banks, because their fundamental 
goal is amelioration of the patient’s health.146 These rationales col­
lapse, however, when the defendant is a commercial entity engaged in 
the business of supplying replacement bodily parts.147
Some states have applied the “service not sale” doctrine in a more 
limited fashion.148 Perhaps most consistent with the underlying ra­
tionale for strict liability is Idaho’s view that the transfer of blood is 
a service except when rendered by a paid blood donor or a profit- 
making blood bank.149 Other states attempt to protect suppliers of 
natural bodily parts from liability by specifically limiting the theories 
on which suit can be brought.180 Another group of states precludes
143 U.C.C. § 2-102.
144 See, e.g., Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions—Implied Warranties 
and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 661.
143 E.g., Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977); Note, Comparative Ap­
proaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 Yale L.J. 1141 (1975).
146 E.g., McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 63 Cal. App. 3d 866, 133 Cal. 
Rptr. 444 (1976); St. Luke’s Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 188 Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975).
147 E.g., Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, Colo. 569 P.2d 1158 (Colo. 1978) (en 
banc). This case involved a transfusion that antedated the Colorado “service not sale” statute. 
The court noted cryptically that the “statute attempts to preclude the use of any non-fault 
theory of recovery in any blood transfusion case against any defendant,” without commenting 
on the success of the attempt. Id. at 1185 n.l.
146 North Carolina declares that its “service not sale” statute does not “alter or restrict the 
liability of a person or institution in negligence or tort in consequence of these services,” N.C. 
Gen. S ta t. § 130A-410 (Supp. 1983), thus arguably contemplating the possibility of a strict 
liability suit. Illinois specifies that anyone providing the service of transferring a part of the 
human body warrants professional standards of care and conformity with Illinois’ blood label­
ling act, limiting the use of purchased blood. III. Ann. S ta t. ch. I l l  V2 §§ 620-6, 5102, 5103 
(Smith Third Supp. 1983). Montana limits the “service not sale” doctrine to blood obtained by 
hospitals, care facilities, or physicians from sources in which they have no financial or control­
ling interest. It also insulates physicians, care facilities, and blood banks from liability without 
fault. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50-33-102 to -104 (1983). Nevada applies the doctrine only to the 
transmission of hepatitis in blood. Nev. Rev. S ta t. § 460.010 (1979). Washington applies the 
doctrine only to hepatitis contracted from volunteer blood. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.54.110 
(1975).
149 Idaho Code § 39-3702 (1977).
1”° Six states offer blanket immunity from liability, absent negligence or willful misconduct,
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suit on an implied warranty theory by specifying that transactions in 
blood or other parts of the human body are not covered by Article 2 
of the Uniform Commercial Code.181 Others state more generally that 
no implied warranties apply to the transfer of blood or tissues.182 
Like the “service not sale” statutes, these provisions leave the possi­
bility of a strict liability suit theoretically open.183
Only New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island have made no stat­
utory efforts to extend immunity to those who are engaged in the 
transfer of human body parts. New York, however, has a long line of 
cases holding that such transfers, even by profitmaking facilities, are 
services rather than sales.184 New Jersey, while suggesting disap­
proval of the service/sale distinction, has found blood to be an un­
avoidably unsafe product for purposes of strict liability.188
to all transferors of human bodily parts. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-1608 (1976); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 
327-51 (1976); N. D. Cent. Code § 43-17-40 (1978); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 8333(a) (Purdon
1982); Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 4590-3(2) (Vernon 1976); Wyo. Stat. § 35-5-110 (1977). Texas 
couples this immunity with a prohibition on blood sales in which payment is made within 
fifteen days. This prohibition is intended as a disincentive to the riskiest group of blood donors 
and violation results in loss of the immunity. Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 4590-3(3)(a), (b) (Vernon 
1976). New Hampshire extends blanket immunity to transferors of blood only. N. H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 507:8-b (1983).
1,1 Alaska Stat. § 45.02.316(e)(1980); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2-316(5) (1974); Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 672.316(5) (West Supp. 1984); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (Michie/Law. Co­
op. 1976); N.D. Cent. Code § 41-02-33-3.d (1983); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 57A-2-315.1 
(1980).
,M Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63 § 2151 (West 1973); Or. Rev. Stat. § 97.300 (1983); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-316(5) (1979); Va. Code § 32.1­
297 (1979).
A Louisiana court, arguing that strict liability represents a broader reallocation of risks 
than implied warranty, concluded that its legislature could have taken the broader step but had 
not. DeBattista v. Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981). But see McDaniel v. 
Baptist Mem. Hosp., 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972) (Tennessee statute abolishing implied war­
ranties for human bodily parts under U.C.C. precludes strict liability suit); Rostocki v. South­
west Fla. Blood Bank, 276 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1973) (same holding under Florida law). The Louisi­
ana legislature subsequently amended the Louisiana Code to abolish strict liability suits for 
defects in transferred body parts against physicians, hospitals and nonprofit blood banks, but 
not against other profit-making facilities. La. Rev. S ta t. Ann. § 9:2797 (West Supp. 3A 1984). 
Arizona similarly extends its immunity from strict liability and implied warranty suits to physi­
cians, hospitals, and nonprofit blood or tissue banks. Ariz. Rev. S tat. Ann. § 32-148 (1976).
New Mexico and Maryland extend the most limited statutory immunity. In New Mexico, 
there are no implied warranties in the transfer of human blood, and strict liability does not 
apply to the transmission of hepatitis in blood. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-5 (1978). By implica­
tion, strict liability suits might be possible in New Mexico for defects in blood other than hepa­
titis. In Maryland, there are no strict liability or implied warranty suits for the transfer of 
hepatitis in blood, but no other liability is precluded. Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann. § 18-402
(1982).
1M E.g., Samuels v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of New York, 432 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); 
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 128 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (1974).
Statutes extending immunity from suits to transferors of parts of 
the human body are thus common. They range from blanket preclu­
sion of suits on all but the classic tort theories of negligence and bat­
tery, to very narrow preclusion of strict liability for the transfer of 
hepatitis in blood. However, arguments that have moved courts and 
legislatures to protect physicians, blood banks, and hospi­
tals—genuine providers of service—should not apply to commercial 
transfers of artificial organs. As both the use of artificial organs and 
natural organ transplants become more widespread, significant differ­
ences in the remedies available to patients injured by the different 
strategies of treatment may emerge. If artificial organs become a 
more realistic alternative to natural transplants, and the supply situ­
ation eases, legislatures should have new reason to question the wis­
dom of the rush to extend immunity beyond genuine services to 
profitmaking facilities engaged in the transfer of parts of the human 
body.
E. Financing Arrangements for Artificial Organs
Liability for defects is by no means the only area of commercial 
law in which artificial organs are likely to pose novel challenges. Fi­
nancing arrangements are another. Artificial organs are likely to be 
very expensive. In 1980, the costs for dialysis were $1.1 billion and 
they are estimated to reach $2.8 billion by 1981.156 It is estimated 
that the artificial heart will cost at least $10,000157 and $20,000 is the 
price Kolff Medical has charged for prototypes of the artificial heart 
and driver implanted in Utah.158 Kolff Medical estimates that its ar­
tificial ear will cost between six and twelve thousand dollars.159 If the 
costs of artificial organs are not shared through public financing or 
insurance programs, methods must be developed to improve access 
for patients who cannot pay the full price. Since artificial organs are 
in some cases reusable, these arrangements might include security in­
terests in the device to finance purchases, leases, and user fees for 
machines that can be shared.
Nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code would prohibit arrang­
ing financing with artificial organs as collateral.160 If such arrange­
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1M U.S. Health Care Financing Administration, 1981 End-Stage Renal Disease Annual 
Report to Congress 38, 107.
107 U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, The Artificial Heart: Cost, Risks and Bene­
fits (1982).
1M Carter, The Business Behind Barney Clark’s Heart, Money, April, 1983, at 130, 133.
1M Id.
1,0 An artificial organ is a consumer good, see U.C.C. §§ 9-105(l)(h), 9-109(1), and an interest
ments emerge, however, so will the inevitable question of what can be 
done when the purchaser can no longer pay. The Code prohibits self­
help repossession that involves a breach of the peace.161 Removal of 
an attached organ necessarily would qualify, but removal of an unat­
tached device such as equipment for hemodialysis at home would 
not. There is some authority that precludes money judgment execu­
tions on the debtor’s essential basics,162 and indeed in most cases the 
artificial organ would be a basic. In addition, the Bankruptcy Code 
exempts professionally prescribed health aids from the bankrupting 
estate.163 But these beginnings by no means form a complete system 
for dealing with the contingency where a patient becomes unable to 
pay for his artificial organ. They do not, for example, touch the issues 
of whether lenders should be able to select only the better credit 
risks for artificial organs, or whether sellers would be obligated to 
continue servicing a debtor that does not pay.
F. Consequences {or the Physician-Patient Relationship
The traditional model of the physician-patient relationship is 
based on freedom of contract. Physicians or patients may refuse to 
enter the relation for whatever reason. Patients may terminate the 
relationship at will. Once the relation has begun, physicians are obli­
gated to continue treatment but may withdraw with adequate notice. 
The expense and experimental nature of artificial organs may place 
new strains on these entrenched features of the relationship.
First, it is a textbook proposition that physicians may turn down 
patients for any reason: too many other patients, concern about the 
patient’s ability to pay, or even sheer dislike or prejudice.164 Absent 
contractual obligations, such as emergency room “on call” arrange­
ments,166 the law does not obligate physicians to provide care even to 
acutely ill patients.
Physicians also may set limits from the outset on treatment rela­
tionships. Care may be limited by specialty.166 It may be limited to a 
single visit167 or to consultation or assistance.168 It may be limited
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taken to secure a loan for its purchase would be a purchase money security interest in con 
sumer goods, see id., § 9-107.
1.1 Id. § 9-503.
1M See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5205(a) (McKinney 1978).
'** 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(9) (1982).
144 A. Holder, supra note 97, at 7.
Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 617 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1980).
,M E.g., Skodje v. Hardy, 47 Wash. 2d 557, 288 P.2d 471 (1955).
1.1 E.g., Miller v. Blackburn, 170 Ky. 263, 185 S.W. 864 (1916).
E.g., Shannon v. Ramsey, 288 Mass. 543, 193 N.E. 235 (Mass. 1934).
geographically.169 It may be limited to particular locations for medi­
cal reasons.170 Or the care may be limited to specific places or times 
for the convenience of the physician;171 house calls are not obligatory. 
Some of these limits can be justified by the demands of good medical 
care, but others clearly cannot.
Hospitals may have somewhat less freedom. Those receiving Hill- 
Burton Act construction funds are required to make a reasonable vol­
ume of services available to people without means.172 Some state reg­
ulations require private general hospitals to provide emergency care, 
regardless of the patient’s ability to pay.173 Other states require pri­
vate hospitals with emergency rooms to treat all patients in acute 
need of care on the theory that having emergency facilities is a repre­
sentation to the public that emergency care will be available.17< This 
obligation, however, does not extend to admitting the emergency pa­
tient.17® Nor are hospital emergency rooms obligated to provide non­
emergency care.176
Thus, on the traditional model there is no obligation to treat any 
particular patient in need of an organ replacement. Physicians, hos­
pitals, and suppliers of replacement organs are not required to accept 
patients who seem poor financial risks, patients without families, pa­
tients they dislike, or any other type of patient. Selection of patients 
in need of organ replacement might become seriously inequitable on 
this model.
There is one background constraint. Those engaged in state action 
are subject to the fourteenth amendment guarantees of equal protec­
tion and due process, and recipients of Medicare funds must not dis­
criminate on racial or ethnic grounds in violation of Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act, or on grounds of handicap or age.177 Thus, the worst
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E.g., McNamara v. Emmons, 36 Cal. App. 2d 199, 97 P.2d 503 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
170 For example, an obstetrician may insist upon hospital birth. E.g., Vidrine v. Mayes, 127 
So. 2d 809 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
171 E.g., Urrutia v. Patino, 297 S.W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
171 42 U.S.C. § 291 c(e) (1976). The statute allows for an exemption if the requirement is not 
financially feasible.
,7* E.g., Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975) (en banc).
I7‘ E.g., Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961); Hunt v. Palm 
Springs Gen. Hosp., 352 So. 2d 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Richard v. Adair Hosp. Found., 
566 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969); see also 
R estatem ent (Second) of T o rts  § 323 (1965). For a criticism of this theory, see Note, Emer­
gency Care: Physicians Should be Placed Under an Affirmative Duty to Render Essential 
Medical Care in Emergency Circumstances, 7 U.C.D. L. Rev. 246 (1974).
175 E.g., Harper v. Baptist Medical Center-Princeton, 341 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1976); Joyner v. 
Alton Ochsner Medical Found., 230 So. 2d 913 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
in  E.g., Fabian v. Matzko, 236 Pa. Super. 267, 344 A.2d 569 (1975).
177 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l; 45 C.F.R. §§ 80, 84.4(a), 90.12 (1983).
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in e q u i t ie s  of discrimination based on race, ethnic origin, or sex are 
precluded. But other inequities, such as the exclusion of patients 
without money or family support, are not. The problem will in all 
likelihood be worsened if relatively few centers have the capacity to 
perform highly sophisticated forms of organ replacement, and alter­
natives to an arbitrary selection process are not readily available. 
Concerns about the fairness of the patient selection process in the 
early stages of hemodialysis178 become mooted by the decision to un­
derwrite the program under Medicare. These concerns will recur if 
lifesaving organ replacement becomes available therapy but is not 
publicly funded, and they will require rethinking of the traditional 
assumption that the decision to accept a patient for treatment is en­
tirely discretionary.
A second entrenched feature of the physician-patient relationship 
that may need to be reconsidered is the assumption that the patient 
can terminate the relationship at will. If an organ replacement is 
scarce or expensive therapy, and one patient has been treated while 
others wait, arguably the lucky patient incurs moral obligations to 
participate in whatever cooperative systems have made his good for­
tune possible. For example, long-term monitoring of patients with re­
placement organs may be important to the development of better 
therapeutic techniques. Perhaps beneficiaries of organ replacement 
should continue to be monitored, and are not morally free simply to 
walk away from an organ replacement program. Moreover, depending 
upon how the replacement organ functions, it may not be possible for 
the recipient to cease to be part of a treatment program and continue 
to survive. If an artificial organ requires servicing, for example, end­
ing participation in a program may raise all the issues posed by deci­
sions to decline lifesaving treatment.
Finally, the more widespread use of organ replacements as therapy 
may force reconsideration of the physician’s right to withdraw from 
the treatment relationship. The traditional view of the physician-pa­
tient relationship is that absent initial understandings to the con­
trary, the duty to continue treatment extends until treatment is no 
longer necessary, the patient discharges the physician, the relation­
ship is dissolved by mutual consent, or the physician withdraws from 
the relationship.179 The patient’s inability or outright refusal to pay
"* E.g., Comment, Patient Selection for Artificial and Transplanted Organs, 82 Harv. L. 
R ev . 1322 (1969).
m  See A. Holder, supra note 92, at 372; D.W. Louisell & H. Williams, supra note 102, at 11 
8.02.
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will not justify the physician from summarily refusing further care.180 
A physician who violates these duties may be sued for 
abandonment.181
The duty to continue treatment, however, does not permanently 
lock physicians into treatment relationships. They may withdraw and 
thereby terminate the obligation to treat. Withdrawal may be ef­
fected for almost any reason, including the patient’s failure to pay, 
but it requires adequate notice and the opportunity for the patient to 
seek alternative care.182 With a patient who does not pay, therefore, 
the physician who wishes to end the relationship without liability 
should tell the patient to make arrangements for alternative care, 
preferably help with such arrangements, and continue to treat the 
patient for a reasonable time in the interim.
Organ replacement potentially poses the hardest case for this 
traditional recommendation: the patient for whom no alternatives 
can be found. In such a case is the physician obligated to continue 
treatment, even if the patient has no prospects of paying? There ap­
pear to be no reported cases that present exactly this dilemma. All 
the reported cases in which physicians have been held liable for 
abandonment of patients who cannot pay involve summary refusals 
to treat patients who, with time, might have found other care, proba­
bly at public expense.183 One commentator has maintained that the 
duty to treat would persist when the patient cannot find alternatives, 
but provides no argument or authority for the claim.184
Nonetheless, it seems doubtful that the freedom of contract model 
would require the physician to continue treatment in such cases. On 
this view, the physician in beginning treatment binds him or herself 
not to terminate it arbitrarily, but does not undertake to provide un­
limited care, whatever the costs. It is terrible to contemplate with­
drawing treatment from a patient who has no alternatives. But the 
freedom of contract view crystallizes an underlying dilemma that will 
become increasingly pressing as organ replacement becomes more 
widely available. The costs of continued therapy for those who can­
not pay either can be absorbed by physicians, shared in some other 
_________________________________________________________________________________
180 E.g., Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937).
181 See Comment, The Action of Abandonment in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 36 Tul. 
L. Rev. 834 (1962).
188 E.g., Capps v. Valk, 189 Kan. 287, 369 P.2d 238 (1962); Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d 
591 (Ky. 1963); A. Holder, supra note 92, at 372.
1,3 E.g., Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wash. 2d 257, 130 P.2d 341 (1942), aff’d on other grounds, 136 
P.2d 187 (1943) (en banc); Ricks, 64 P.2d 208.
184 A. Holder, supra note 92, at 373.
way, or not incurred at all. If at some point it becomes unfair to im­
pose the costs on physicians and too burdensome to share them, life- 
saving therapy will have to end for some patients. Arguably this is 
the only rational choice, but it must be made fairly and not simply on 
the basis of individual physicians’ decisions about when to withdraw.
III. C o n c l u s i o n
Organ replacement is a medical triumph. But it seems all too likely 
to become a legal and social debacle. As replacement moves from ex­
perimentation to therapeutic potential, the pressures of widespread 
demand may make rational policy choice increasingly difficult. Organ 
replacement will save lives, but it will do so more fairly if we move 
now to reexamine the tort and contract law obligations of those in­
volved in the replacement process.
l 9 8 4 ]  O R G A N  T R A N S P L A N T S  5 9
